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Dowry in Bangladesh: A Search from an International Perspective for an Effective Legal 








For some 40 years, Bangladesh has fought a losing battle against the existence of dowries 
and their associated abuse with no indication of even a minimal impact as dowry demands inflate 
and violence increases. In one year alone, dowry related violence claimed the lives of 325 
women and contributed to 66.7 per cent of the violent incidents against women. This article aims 
to investigate the appropriateness and effectiveness of legal approaches to dowry and propose a 
different standard for redressing women’s disadvantaged situation in the traditional culture of 
Bangladesh. 
 




Hafeeza is just one of the thousands of dowry victims whose experiences symbolise the 
harsh reality for many women living in Bangladesh. She was attacked by her husband just days 
after her marriage. Angry, he beat her and dragged her by her hair along the roadway. The 
violence was ongoing. 
 
Once my father-in-law became sick, I was three months pregnant. My husband 
said he needed money to treat his father, asked me to [fetch] ... my unpaid dowry. 
My family couldn’t get any money to give him, so he beat me, again and again.... 
I was sick...[and] left my job. My husband became so angry. He said, ‘Why did 
you leave the job without my permission? I don’t want that child, I want money. 
Eat this medicine and let the child die, so you can go to work again’ (Ariyathilaka 
2009, 70-71). 
 
Dowry has been one of the leading causes of torture of women in Bangladesh.
2
 The Dowry 
Prohibition Act 1980 (the Act) outlaws dowry with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 
and safeguard from physical abuses is repeatedly affirmed in several pieces of legislation 
(Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 35(5); Penal Code 1860 ss 324–
331). Women’s dignity as core value of human rights law is deeply entrenched in numerous 
international instruments under which Bangladesh also assumes affirmative obligations to 
respect and ensure this right.
3
 Despite this, dowry-related cruelty is endemic. In 2011 alone, 
                                                          
1
 LLB (Hons) and LLM (Bangladesh), LLM (UWS), PhD (UOW), Australia, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, 
Islamic University, Bangladesh; Honorary Research Fellow, School of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia. 
2
 Dowry refers to money or valuable property, which are demanded by the husband or in -laws from a bride’s family 
as a consideration of marriage. 
3
 Bangladesh ratified numerous international human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979. 
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dowry-related violence claimed 325 lives and resulted in 7,079 incidents of dowry-harassment 
(Haq 2012). This represents only a fraction of total dowry-victims since women are very 
reluctant to unearth their ‘hidden wounds’ publicly for several reasons, including loss of family 
honour and privacy, fear of in-law reprisals and poor access to inadequate and costly legal 
remedies (Begum 2005a, 228-229). Further, in a substantial number of cases, influential 
perpetrators act with impunity due to corruption and victims are left with virtually no legal 
recourse (Begum 2009, 178-179). The underlying cause of this rising trend of violence, 
notwithstanding the existence of a series of positive statutes, necessitates an exploration of 
factors affecting the origins and development of dowry and how it is addressed in Bangladesh. 
I argue that law’s failure to recognise a number of crucial aspects of dowry—including a 
range of serious flaws in the Act and the ‘softness’ of the current enforcement procedure—
significantly contributes to the nourishment of dowry. This article explores dowry through an 
analysis of the Act with special reference to a number of legal provisions in India and the USA 
and recommends the reconceptualisation of laws to redress women’s sufferings in abusive 
marital relationships. Before advancing with this discussion, it is, however, important to 
acknowledge that despite legislative changes and progressive attempts by the judiciary, dowry or 
other spousal abuses still persist in those jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is evident that awareness 
of dowry/domestic abuses and for the need for legal sanctions to combat it has been raised higher 
than ever before and the law does have a significant contribution to achieve this end. 
Additionally, strengthening legal regime may not be a panacea for redressing dowry in 
Bangladesh, and some socio-economic factors may remain dominant perpetuating dowry. Yet, 
this should neither outweigh the necessity for legal changes nor is it practicable to address all 
socio-economic aspects of dowry in a single study. 
This article is predominantly based on my doctoral research which drew on investigations 
that I undertook among NGOS and in different courts where I collected dowry-related cases, and 
on relevant materials from both primary and secondary legal resources. The discussion begins 
with a brief exploration of the socio-cultural context of the evolution of the concept of dowry and 
its broad acceptance in Bangladesh. 
 
 
Socio-cultural and Legal Context in Bangladesh 
Traditionally, Bangladesh has been run along the line of a patriarchal social system
4
 
which, as elsewhere in the world, has promoted an unequal power relation, a rigid division of 
labour and gender roles (Begum 2012, 571-573). All social institutions ranging from the 
household to the state favour the promotion of males’ careers as the future family bread winners. 
This reinforces women’s exclusion from resources and power. Society’s allegiance to those 
values combined with poverty, ignorance and lack of education have perpetuated women’s 
subordination over the decades (Begum 2012). 
Some important initiatives, however, have been undertaken since independence in 1971 
to improve women’s status. These include: a series of constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
equal opportunity in the public life; the right to freedom from torture and equal protection of law 
(Constitution arts 27–8, 9–10). Specific legislation such as the Act and the Women and Children 
Repression (Special Provisions) Act 2000 (WCR Act) has also been enacted to address women’s 
repression. 
                                                          
4
 Patriarchy is a concept and a pervasive social structure, socially established via economic, political and 
sociocultural processes through which men gain control over women: see A Taslitz 1996, 393-395. 
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Nevertheless, the overall record of women’s rights in Bangladesh is very disappointing 
and that often reflects disrespect for the rule of law. Women are frequently denied equal 
protection of law, and dowry remains ‘one of the most intractable violations’ of women’s rights. 
Torturing women where dowry demand is unsatisfied contributes to 66.7 per cent of violent acts 
against women and 50 per cent of all murders of women in Bangladesh (Monsoor, 1999).  
 
 
Meaning, Origins and Development of Dowry 
‘Dowry’ refers to property, cash or goods given to the bridegroom as a consideration of 
marriage. The Act defines dowry as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given 
either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage by another party at any time before or after 
the marriage as a consideration of marriage (The Act s 2). Originally, premised on the welfare of 
a daughter, dowry was a Hindu legal concept adopted to compensate women for the prohibition 
on women’s inheritance of parental property (Jethmalani 1995).  
The contemporary concept of dowry in no way resembles the original concept of dowry. 
Over time, what was voluntary has become obligatory—an essential part of marriage and 
recovered through coercion of brides (Chowdhury 2010, 202). Research in Bangladesh’s 
Northern Districts revealed that about 80 per cent of marriages required dowries and more than 
20,000 marriages were terminated within five years due to dowry conflict (Monsoor 1999). In 
numerous instances, the groom’s dowry demand far exceeds the capacity of the bride’s father to 
pay. One study claimed that dowry payments constitute ‘more than 200 times the average daily 
wage’ and have been ‘one of major causes of chronic poverty in Bangladesh (IRIN 2009). 
Dowry ensures parents a return on their investment in a son’s education (JAGORI 2012). 
Ultimately, the groom’s family holds the bargaining power, basing the dowry on his educational 
and occupational status (Nangia 1997, 644). This practice has led to increased economic 
dependence and powerlessness of women, rendering them an ‘unproductive burden’ on their 
family. A daughter may be resented in the parental home after she reaches marriageable age and 
unwelcome (for staying with them) after her marriage. Obtaining a spouse becomes increasingly 
difficult with age and tensions mount regarding preserving the daughter’s ‘virginity’, without 
which a suitable groom will be impossible to find. Within this social construct, parents try to 
provide lucrative incentives to secure a suitable spouse to ensure their daughter’s future. 
Attention from both families promotes a strong sense of ‘egoism’ among grooms, and 
creates diverse avenues for ‘earning’ via dowry. Marriage has begun to lose its sanctity and 
become a means of making money, with more emphasis placed on property and cash than on the 
bride herself (Naved 2012, 830-835). On occasion, a ticket to the Middle East to find 
employment is demanded as dowry (Khan 2001, 124). This is how the socio-cultural and 
economic factors persuade the perpetuation of dowry in Bangladesh. 
 
 
Dowry Prohibition Act 1980 (‘The Act’) 
The Act is the primary law dealing with dowry in Bangladesh. It makes dowry a criminal 
offence, originally punishable by a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment or a fine of 
BDT500 (approximately USD 6.25) or both. The Act criminalises the taking and giving dowry, 
and governs associated investigation and trial proceedings. In attempts to redress deficiencies, it 
was amended on a number of occasions. For example, its 1986 amendment increased the penalty 
for claiming dowry and made dowry a non-cognisable and non-bailable offence (Ordinance 36 
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of 1986). Dowry-violence is also subject to other laws such as the WCR Act. Nevertheless, the 
evidence (below) demonstrates that legislative enactment has proved largely ineffective. 
 
Legislative Impact on Dowry 
Despite being the subject matter of several pieces of legislation, dowry remains pervasive 
and a source of death and torture of women (Figure 1). Any earlier downward trend in deaths has 
reversed: in 2011, dowry resulted in 325 deaths of women, up from 249 in 2010 and 227 in 2009, 
and substantially up from the 169 reported in 2002‘Angry Brides’; Islam 2012).  
There is also the question of dowry-related violence failing to proceed to trial. The Inter 
Press Service reported 5,331 cases of dowry in 2010 which jumped to 7,079 in 2011, and by the 
first nine months of 2012 the figure hit 4,563 (Haq 2012). The Asian Legal Resource Centre 
noted 119 cases of dowry-related violence, including 78 deaths in the first half of 2009, yet an 
Amnesty International report disclosed that from January to October 2009 police received at 
least 3,413 complaints of beating and other abuse of women over dowry disputes (Bangladesh - 
Amnesty International Report 2010). A further 172 dowry-related murder cases were recorded in 
2008 and 187 in 2007(IRIN Report) while in 2006 dowry-related violent incidents totalled 307, 
with 243 being killed and 64 tortured(‘Violence against Women in Bangladesh still high’ 2012) 
and 227 reported dowry-related killings in 2005 (‘Dowry Deaths’).  
These actions completely violate women’s dignity and any marital or familial 
relationship. 
 









2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 
Source: As detailed above. 
 
Thus the current legal approach appears to have failed to protect women against dowry and 
associated violence. Instead, dowry has created multi-faceted social problems to which the law is 
also inept in responding.  
Despite the gradual increase in female empowerment, an early marriage is still perceived 
as the best strategy to provide a ‘safe shelter’ for a young girl, regardless of her parent’s socio-
economic status. Therefore, most women lack even basic educational opportunities, a 
prerequisite for economic power. After marriage, aside from love and concern for the children 
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and husband, a number of crucial factors pressure a woman to preserve her marriage, even at the 
expense of her physical or emotional safety. Foremost is her economic dependence on the 
husband for her survival which increases with parenthood. There is no governmental support for 
women who leave, or are thrown out of, their marital homes; the alternative is to return to their 
parental home (if they survive the abuse). This is not merely a financial burden on parents, who 
have already expended substantial amounts in relation to her marriage, but a matter of shame for 
her parents and the wider family. If parents are deceased, she may rely on her relatives (again 
most unlikely due to socio-economic constraints) or become ‘destitute’, forced to beg to maintain 
herself. All these concerns put women at a great risk, having no viable options to continuing the 
marriage. Grooms’ families are well aware of the social stigma attached to unmarried and 
divorced women and use this to extort dowry. Current dowry legislation fails to recognise this 
experience of women in Bangladesh, and the Act itself suffers from some fundamental 
shortcomings which need to be addressed. 
 
Major Flaws in the Act  
Penalty for Taking Dowry 
Despite the introduction of strict penalty for taking dowry in the 1986 amendment, the 
practice continues to increase. One reason may be the degree of emphasis on court discretion 
regarding penalties. Section 3 provides that the penalty for any person giving or taking dowry 
shall be imprisonment from 1 to 5 years, or a fine or both. Consequently, the court can reduce the 
sentence; and imprisonment is equated with a fine—however, a fine is not fixed or properly 
clarified. Thus, sanctions appear vulnerable to judicial bias and any higher socio-economic status 
of the husband. Given the alarming increase of dowry incidents, this discretionary power must be 
removed. Additionally, the penalty specified should be increased when the taking of dowry 
exceeds the financial capacity of the bride’s father.  
 
Similar Liability for Giving and Taking Dowry 
The Act fails to recognise the gravity of the crime and the immorality involved in ‘taking 
dowry’ by placing dowry giver and dowry taker on an equal plane (s 3). It fails to take into 
account the unequal power balance in operation. Dowry-takers are more blameworthy as they are 
motivated by greed and utilise the groom’s superior bargaining position. By contrast, the deeply 
embedded socio-cultural values attached to a ‘marriageable daughter’ force parents to offer 
dowry. Their concerns include providing for her future via marriage and reduced marriage 
prospects as she ages. In numerous instances, parents incur huge financial liabilities to satisfy the 
in-law’s demands. This does not reflect their free will. The reality of Bangladesh therefore 
compels parents to offer dowry. 
Several factors discourage women or their parents from going to the court, such as 
unusual delay in disposing of suits, financial incapability, damage to family prestige, threats 
from the in-laws and a lack of cooperation from law enforcement agencies. Together with these, 
the ‘giving dowry’ offence essentially discourages women from seeking justice and reporting, 
making potential prosecution and investigation impossible (Shaha 2004, 216). To make the Act 
of greater benefit and utility to women, section 3 should be amended to penalise only the takers 
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Voluntary Transfer of property to the Bride 
Section 3 of India’s Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 considers all voluntary presents of a 
marriage the exclusive property of the bride, and requires those presents to be listed. The 
Bangladesh legislation does not contain such a provision; instead, section 6 which dealt with the 
same issue was repealed. To avoid list manipulation and conflicting claims before the court, in 
India it is also suggested that such a list should be registered with the court  (Diwan 1995, 461-
462). To ensure women’s exclusive control over the property, it is further recommended that the 
listed property not be able to be transferred to, or disposed of, within five years of marriage 
without the permission of the Family Court on an application of the bride (Diwan 1995, 462).  
Even though it is difficult to decide what is and what is not a voluntary gift and the fact 
that the listing requirement is still susceptible to abuse by in-laws, because a bride’s failure to let 
them use such properties may yet result in undesirable incidents; nevertheless, the formal listing 
and registration requirements help women establish legal control over the property and make it 
more difficult for the in-laws to extort that property. This provision should be incorporated in 
section 3 of the Act to strengthen women’s position in the home. 
 
Penalty for Demanding Dowry 
Section 4 of the Act makes ‘direct and indirect’ demands for dowry an offence. Making a 
merely ‘demand’ an offence is appropriate recognition of the magnitude of dowry. ‘Indirect 
demand’, however, has not been defined by the Act; neither have any guidelines been developed 
in this regard. This omission may advance undue expectations of the in-laws under the pretext of 
‘voluntary gifts’ (instead indirect demand) and perpetuate physical/emotional abuse of the bride 
which, oftentimes, remains invisible (State of Punjab v. Singh [1991], 1537). Therefore, certain 
categories of actions and inactions, especially linked with the treatment by and behaviour of in-
laws towards a bride should be categorised under the ‘indirect demand’. 
 
Voluntary Gifts to be for the Benefit of the Wife 
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 deleted section 6 of the Act, which 
had forbidden the transfer of bridal dowry properties within a year of marriage. Contravention 
had been punishable by a year’s imprisonment or a fine of BDT500 (USD 6.25) or both. The 
current forms of marital-disputes in Bangladesh do not suggest that dowry disappears due to the 
enactment of the Act but rather confirm the opposite. Thus the law fails to combat the problem, 
while it took away an important right. Facing similar problems, India did not repeal its 
equivalent, notwithstanding a number of amendments made to its Dowry Act. 
Given the traditional economic dependence and powerlessness of Bangladeshi women, 
section 6 should be restored as gifts worth BDT500 are still allowed under the Act. Section 6, 
however, will not deal with the ‘dowry property’ as it would be contrary to the spirit and 
objectives of the Act. A provision concerning ‘voluntary gifts’ (paralleling India’s legislation) 
should be there inserted to provide greater economic security for women in the matrimonial 
home. Under this provision, all gifts given at marriage must be registered in the name of the 
bride and in the event of the dissolution of marriage revert to her. This will foster women’s 
economic power and independence. 
The penalty for non-compliance (under section 6) is nominal in terms of the amount of 
property delivered in a modern marriage. Given that it is relatively simple for in-laws to exploit 
properties and pay the fine of BDT500 (USD 6.25), the penalty must be increased in order to act 
as a genuine deterrent. 
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Some procedural factors further limit women legal remedies. The following discussion 





Most dowry violence is committed in the privacy of the in-laws’ house, leaving hardly 
independent corroborative witnesses or direct evidence to prove the crime (Prakash v. State of 
Punjab [1992], SCC 212). Consequently, the fate of such cases depends on the honesty and 
objectivity of the investigating police (Buzawa 1992, 67). The 1986 Amendment allows police to 
arrest the person accused of dowry violence without a warrant but provides little guidance 
regarding enforcement. Police reportedly seldom enforce arrests and recognise dowry as a crime. 
In numerous instances, police—believing that the victim provoked the violent incident—refuse 
to register a case brought by a woman ((Buzawa 1992, 67). Police insensivity and systematic 
corruption facing complainants attempting to file suit is aptly illustrated by the following 
testimony: 
 
“The duty officer was not willing at first to take up our case. My daughter and I 
were pleading since 2 pm to convince them of the brutality of the situation and 
finally at 8.30 pm the Munshi [officer?] agreed to write up the FIR [first 
information report]. However, before doing this he asked for a ‘service charge’. 
Then another police officer came with a sheet of paper and said, ‘Tell the truth. I 
believe you have ... hurt yourself ...’.Before finalising the FIR, he asked for money. 
I gave him the money... after a month, I went to the police station ... they told us 
that there was no evidence of any case filed by me.... Frustrated and in despair, I 
came to know my boundaries. There is no hope for a woman like me in the outside 
world” (Matin 2000, 22).  
 
Equally, manipulation of the investigatory process and police failure to investigate or take 
proper action helps many offenders to go legally unchallenged. On some occasions, no action is 
taken even after years, ‘until evidence disappears’ (Begum 2005a, 263), while the state places 
arrest powers exclusively on police. Absence of legal compulsion to arrest promotes corruption 
and inappropriate police practice (Blanchet 1996, 188-189); the abuser’s economic and political 
power often impedes objective investigation. The existing approach ignores not only the 
‘vulnerable position’ of dowry victims in an unequal abusive relation but also evidences serious 
flaws in the country’s criminal law. There is also hardly any precedent in Bangladesh where 
police have been held responsible for failure to perform their legal duties (Begum 2005b, 88). In 
collecting and producing evidence and dealing with dowry-violence victims, police also lack 
proper training, sensitivity and expertise. 
No accurate official statistics exist to provide a full account of registered dowry cases. 
Those available, however, suggest that a total of 2,761 cases of dowry-violence were registered 
with the country’s courts (Baseline Report), far below the actual incidence of such violence. 
ASK estimates that only 10.5 per cent of possible cases were filed against the perpetrator(ASK 
2002, 147). The record of the Women’s Affairs Division confirms that only 5 to 10 per cent of 
the reported cases of violence or death in custody could be taken to court (Begum 2005b, 264).  
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Figure 2 reveals that of reported dowry violence, nearly 40 per cent of cases were not lodged 




Apart from the issue of corruption involved in arrests in Bangladesh,
 
in other jurisdictions the 
rate of arrest may be as low as three per cent where the decision is left to police discretion 
(Suarez 1994, 459). 
Numerous countries have attempted to change their response to domestic abuse through 
legislative changes and special measures. Most—including the USA, Australia, Canada and 
India—enacted Domestic Violence Acts, which represent a comprehensive response designed to 
address and redress various dynamics of domestic abuse (Violence Against Women Act 1993 
(US), Protection from Domestic Violence Act 1997 (India)). Arrest policies and police training 
also received significant attention to improve the response to domestic violence cases.
5
 
Several US states, for example, enacted mandatory arrest legislation, requiring police to 
arrest the abuser if there is a ‘probable cause’ of domestic violence (42 USCS 46). Failure to 
comply with this legislation results in legal action against the police (Donaldson v. City of Seattle 
[1992] Wash App LEXIS  201, 202), and an affirmative obligation on the state (Hynson v. City of 
Chester [1990] US Dist LEXIS 2557). These liabilities are justified to achieve the objectives of 
the mandatory arrest statute and due protection clause (Schuerman 1992, 373). Case law has 
narrowed police immunity and placed emphasis on early intervention in domestic abuse cases 
(Rev Code Wash (ARCW) § 10.99.070). 
An empirical field experiment found that the national arrest rate, most of which are 
domestic, rose by 70 per cent within four years from the introduction of the mandatory 
legislation (Begum 2005b, 266–67). Nevertheless, a number of experiments with mandatory 
arrest produced conflicting findings. Research concentrated on three cities found evidence of a 
deterrent effect on mandatory arrest, while in three other cities the experiment produced evidence 
                                                          
5
 E.g. in India, police are mandated to investigate every death of women under suspicious circumstances that occurs 
within seven years of marriage. See, Department of Women and Child Development, 2000. 
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of increased violence (Sherman 1992, 25). Nevertheless, mandatory arrest is found to be the 
most effective deterrent to repeat incidents of domestic abuse in the US (Lindgren
 
2010). 
Bangladesh Parliament enacted the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 
2010 which obligates a police officer to make the victim aware of possible redress, however, it 
does not provide for mandatory arrest and is not yet in force. 
Recognising the systematic reluctance of police in regards to ‘private affairs’ and the 
police’s corrupt practices, this paper proposes mandatory arrest provision for dowry offences in 
Bangladesh so as to ensure police execute of their duty. The greatest advantages of mandatory 
arrest are: (i) immediate protection provided to the victim; (ii) in-laws being cautioned about 
their violent or indecent behaviour; and (iii) making reluctant police officials work more 
carefully and sensitively. 
The present Police Reforms Program in place in Bangladesh aims to improve the 
efficiency and professionalism of police, and address their own lack of sensitivity in dealing with 
vulnerable women victims (Police Reform Programme 2009). This is a positive development, 
and it is hoped that this initiative includes a compulsory training which: (i) must reflect 
international standards; (ii) specify how to approach victims and conduct dowry trial 
investigations; and (iii) include consequences for police for inadequate and inappropriate 
responses to dowry victims. More importantly, a minimum standard must be maintained by the 
government in ensuring dowry remedies since it undertook obligations to remove, inter alia, 
negative social practices that damage women’s dignity and to restructure the criminal justice 
system (CEDAW, arts 4–5). 
Combating domestic abuse, especially dowry should be a priority and resourced 
accordingly, since such abuse can produce severe consequences for not only the immediate 
victims but the family’s children and the entire community. Children who witness domestic 
violence suffer from various emotional and developmental difficulties (L v. V [2000] 4 All ER 
609; Re-R [2002] 1 FLR 621). 
 
 
Dowry Prosecution Policy 
In Bangladesh, dowry prosecution entirely depends on the victims’ decision; prosecutors 
are under no obligation to complete a prosecution (Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, s 494). 
Even after filing a case, prosecutors can do nothing when the victim refuses to testify against the 
offender or decides to drop the case (Monsoor 1999, 238). Current practice ignores the victim’s 
vulnerability to intimidation, and undermines any idea that a ‘prosecutor’s duties are not only to 
convict but to seek justice’ (Wanless 1996, 567) and facilitates case manipulation at the 
offenders’ behest. In Bangladesh, there are instances of a bride not being taken to the bridal 
chamber due to her father’s failure to satisfy dowry demands. After being physically tortured, 
one bride was ‘forced to sign on a blank stamp paper, pledging not to take the matter to court or 
arbitration’ then allowed to return home (‘Victims of dowry hits back’). 
To address problems associated with prosecution, many countries, including the US 
adopted a pro-prosecution policy, which placed the onus of prosecution of domestic abuse cases 
on the prosecutor. This circumvents a victim’s withdrawing a complaint after filing it and entitles 
the prosecutor to proceed with the case (without the victim’s cooperation) using police reports 
and other indirect evidence. With this prosecution policy, San Diego experienced ‘greater 
success in obtaining convictions’ (Gwinn 1999, 311). Many states require state attorneys to 
develop special training units and specialist prosecutors for domestic abuse prosecutions (eg, 
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Florida Annotated Statute § 2901 (2002). One obligates the court ‘not to dismiss any charge’ of 
domestic violence, and make both victim and accused understand that prosecution of the case 
will be ‘determined by the prosecutor and not by the victim’ (General Laws of Rhode Island s 
12-29-4 (b) (1)(2002). 
Yet, the pro-prosecution policy is criticised for having potential to re-victimise the 
victim, as it considers the victim a hostile witness when she refuses to testify. Nevertheless, a 
number of states recognised the benefits of pro-prosecution policy and enacted legislation to 
implement this policy (Suarez 1994, p. 462). 
Given the violent nature of dowry-practice and the acquittal rate in Bangladesh for 
dowry-related violence, legislators should place the full responsibility for prosecution on the 
prosecutor. Families must come to realise that their undue dowry demands will be taken up by 
the prosecutors themselves and relieve victims of any offender attempts to influence their 
decision. Alternatively, prosecutors should be legally accountable to consider dowry cases more 
seriously. As prosecutors are already engaged in dowry trials in Bangladesh, the introduction of a 
pro-prosecution policy will take little effort. 
 
 
Presumption of Innocence 
Bangladesh follows the Common Law approach to the presumption of innocence which 
holds that the accused should be presumed innocent until the court finds her or him guilty 
beyond any reasonable doubt. A rigid application of this principle has often failed to provide 
remedies for dowry victims in Bangladesh (Agarwal 1988, 220). In Begum v Haque, for 
example, the wife obtained judgment for a dowry demand against her husband. The Sessions 
Court on appeal acquitted the husband on grounds of the benefit of slightest doubt (Agarwal 
1988, 220). 
Legislative and judicial initiatives in foreign jurisdictions have striven to address 
difficulties in proving violent cases, including dowry. India, for example, inserted sections 113-A 
and 113-B in the Indian Evidence Act 1872 under amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act. 
Section 113-A creates an opposite presumption, stating that if a woman commits suicide within 
seven years from her marriage and if it is shown that her husband or in-laws subjected her to 
cruelty or harassment, the court may presume that the husband or in-laws has abetted the suicide. 
Section 113-B makes the presumption of dowry death mandatory, which provides that if it is 
shown that the accused subjected the deceased woman to cruelty in respect of any demand for 
dowry, ‘the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.’ Even though men 
argued that this provision prompts abusive practices by educated women and may work unfairly 
to the disadvantage of men, there is no authoritative evidence to support this view (‘Dowry law 
in India’). 
The Supreme Court (SC) of India, in a series of decisions, set aside the acquittal order of 
the trial court and refused to place considerable weight on the benefit of slightest doubt (Begum 
2005a, 233–7). In Uttar Pradesh v Srivastava, the court held that every hypothesis of innocence 
is capable of being negated on evidence, 
 
[But] this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis of 
innocence … [nor] does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the 
slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and 
not otherwise  (1992) AIR SC 840, 846-847). 
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Given significant difficulties in proving dowry claims in Bangladesh, similar provision of 
presumption should be legislated to address those instances where there is evidence of cruelty or 
grievous hurt to women in connection with dowry. This will make it easier for women to seek 
criminal remedies for various degree of severity not just where a fatality resulted. Experiencing 
repeated cruelty is sensibly more severe and devastating than a single shot or attempt to death. 
It is, however, important to acknowledge here that the accused should not be deprived of 
the right to the benefit of the doubt, even if that doubt is ‘slight’, as it is a fundamental principle 
of national and international law that every person should be entitled to a fair trial (e.g. 
Constitution, art 35; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, art 14(2)). 
Attempting therefore to redress dowry using presumption may not be totally desirable; yet given 
the vital need that exists, and the fact that evidentiary difficulties that often frustrate women’s 
judicial remedies in Bangladesh, the concept of ‘the benefit of slightest doubt’—  but not the 
benefit of doubt itself — should be reviewed. This review is necessary not to limit the accused’s 
right to ‘the benefit of slightest doubt’ but to limit the way this is used against dowry victims in 
Bangladesh. Similarly, the scope of this benefit should not be extended to such ‘fanciful and 
remote possibilities that deflect the course of justice’ (Srivastava 1992, 845-6). Judicial 
precedents in India and other jurisdictions could be relevant references to support this review (eg 
for India, Srivastava, 1992; for the UK, L v. DPP [2002] 2 All ER 854). In State v Coetzee, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa addressed ‘....a paradox at the heart of all criminal 
procedure, ... the more serious the crime and the greater the public interest in securing 
convictions of the guilty….’ ([1997] 2 LRC 593).  
Thus, the principle of presumption of innocence should serve not only to protect a 
particular individual on trial, but to maintain public confidence in ensuring the integrity and 
security of the legal system.  
 
 
The Burden of Proof  
Dowry-violence due to its private nature generally lacks independent witnesses as 
mentioned. Legal evidentiary requirements which place the burden of proof on the victim 
exacerbate the situation. ‘Benefit of doubt’ and a lack of evidence mean that dowry victims often 
fail to prove their case, resulting in the accused’s eventual acquittal (Akbar v. State 1999) 51 
DLR 264). 
In relation to prosecution, India has advanced a number of positive measures to address 
difficulties experienced by courts in dealing with dowry. These include a 1986 amendment of its 
Dowry Act that shifted the burden of proof to the person alleged to have taken or abetted the 
taking of dowry (Dowry Act (India) s 8A), and dowry death was defined to make it clearer for 
the court to apply the provision (Indian Penal Code s 304B). Furthermore, another amendment to 
India’s Criminal Procedure Code 1973 made ‘post-mortem’ examination mandatory in cases 
involving suicide by a woman within seven years of her marriage and compulsorily required a 
magistrate to inquire into such cases (ss 174(3) & 176). These amendments empowered the court 
to initiate proceedings on its own knowledge or on the basis of a police report, even in the 
absence of a report lodged by an aggrieved person (JAGORI). 
Since similar dowry-violence-death and difficulties associated with proving such deaths 
also prevail in Bangladesh, it is submitted that the Act needs to be amended to incorporate the 
above provisions. The existing evidentiary burden from the victim’s perspective should be 
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abolished in Bangladesh for two main reasons: (i) in recognition of the vulnerable situation of 
victims in unequal power relations in a tradition-bound society; and (ii) to remove difficulties in 
regard to proving allegations under an adversarial court system. Where death is involved, this 
approach conquers difficulties in regard to victims’ families failing to initiate cases or seek post 
mortems to supply valuable evidence, or police reluctance to proceed (both perhaps due to the 
accused’s influence). In regards to non-fatal dowry-related violence and allegations of dowry 
demand, the shifting of the burden of proof will again prove of assistance. The court would have 
clear guidelines and the provisions would help remedy the suffering of women in ‘private 
affairs’, where current trial proceedings fall short (State v. Pramanik [19991] 43 DLR (AD) 64, 
76). This should also send a strong message to in-laws tempted to press their demands. 
It is, however, logical to acknowledge here again that such a shift may unjustifiably limit 
the accused's right to a fair trial. There are strong academic arguments on issues as to whether a 
reverse onus infringes the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law. Yet, a reasonable limit to this right has been recognised globally in a range of laws and 
judicial decisions. Express statutory exceptions to this rule are found in numerous laws (eg s 101 
of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (UK); Dowry Act 1961 (India) s 8A).  Lord Griffiths in R v 
Hunt observed: 
 
I have little doubt that the occasions on which a statute will be construed as 
imposing a burden of proof on [the accused] which do not fall within this 
formulation are likely to be exceedingly rare. But … I would prefer to adopt the 
formula as an excellent guide to construction rather than as an exception to a rule 
([1987] 1 All ER, 111).  
 
Accordingly, a limited qualification to the benefit of innocence may be recognised in dealing 
with the specific circumstances of dowry victims in Bangladesh. This is necessary not only to 
accommodate the rights of the parties but to ‘serve as a deterrent for the commission of like 
offences by others’ (Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) AIR SC 1470, 1474).  
Given law’s failure to combat dowry, one significant consideration may be who and what 
deserve to have greater emphasis: ‘the criminal or society; the law violator or the abider’ (Basu 
v. West Bengal (1997) AIR SC 610, 618). The Indian SC held that with dowry where a serious 
threat to the victim’s honour and life existed, the court in addressing a dowry case must show 
utmost sensitivity so that (i) the guilty should not escape punishment; and (ii) the victim of the 
crime can be satisfied that ‘ultimately the Majesty of law has prevailed’ (Krishnappa 2000, 
1475). Frequent acquittals due to faulty investigations and lack of evidence have wider 
implications for the society as a whole as victims would be discouraged from reporting and 
crimes rewarded (Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 1393, 1394). In a leading judgment 
Lord Woolf applauds flexibility. 
 
In order to maintain the balance between the individual and the society as a 
whole, rigid and inflexible standards should not be imposed ... to resolve the 
difficult and intransigent problems with which society is faced when seeking to 
deal with serious crime (Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Lo Chak-man [1993] 
3 All ER 939). 
 
Flaws in other relevant legal provisions of dowry in Bangladesh further facilitate marital abuses. 
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Inadequate Legal Response to Polygamy and Marriage Documentation: Their Impact on 
Dowry 
One of the most damaging but overlooked consequences of dowry is that dowry-related 
disputes lead to divorce or polygamous marriage with little or no redress for women. Dowry 
incentives encourage a husband to abuse and abandon a wife to acquire another dowry by 
marrying another. Empirical research on 50 divorced women in Borguna District, reveals that 40 
were divorced ‘because their families could not pay dowry money to their husbands’ (Montu 




Husband-initiated divorce, however, results in some legal rights such as dower
7
 and 
spousal maintenance. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s it was claimed that in Bangladesh, ‘[there] 
has been no case of the dower debt being paid on divorce nor of any wife receiving any 
maintenance for the iddat
8
 period’ (Sobhan 1982-83, 256).  New family courts and processes 
have brought some changes (and increased recovery rates for funds) – but these are still patently 
insufficient with many women continuing to experience difficulties. Additionally, non-
registration of marriage in a significant number of cases leads to the refusal of dower and 
maintenance for wives by the court (Khan 1999). Whilst registration is compulsory, it is 
frequently ignored in rural areas since the penalty can easily be afforded, being only three 
months jail or a BDT500 (approximately USD 6.25) fine. 
In regards to polygamy, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 imposes some 
restrictions. Section 6, for example, requires a husband to obtain a prior permission from the 
Arbitration Council
9
 to contract another marriage during an existing marriage. Penalties for 
contravention are imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to BDT10000 (USD125) or 
both (the Ordinance 1961 s 6(5)b). Yet, unsanctioned polygamy remains rampant. With the 
penalties for minimal, husbands generally ‘do not feel the necessity to seek permission from the 
council and even if they do so they threaten the existing wife with consequences like divorce’ 
(Khan 1999), further evidence of her vulnerability. Being required to produce a copy of the 
‘Nikhanama’ of the second marriage, a first wife is unlikely to successfully seek remedy for a 
husband’s noncompliance.10 
The only meaningful way to eliminate dowry is to recognise its hidden aspects and to 
reconstruct laws to address those. To restrict polygamy, the requirement to produce ‘Nikanama’ 
before the court to prove a husband’s second marriage must be removed. Instead, witness 
statements should be accepted as a proof. Sanctions for failure to comply with legal provisions 
regarding polygamy and maintenance must be increased. The legal consequences will sensibly 
                                                          
6
 Bangladesh is predominantly a Muslim (88%) country. 
7
 Dower is part of a Muslim marriage. Underlying the prestige of a marriage contract and as a mark of honour to the 
wife, Muslim law obligates a husband to pay the dower. See the  Holy Qu’rān, s 4 v 4;  s. 2 v. 236. 
8
 Iddat is a period of waiting during which a woman whose marriage has been dissolved is prohibited from marrying 
another person. The objective is to determine the paternity and legitimacy of any child.   
9
 The Arbitration Council comprises a Chairman and representatives from both parties (husband and existing wife) 
which considers, inter alia, whether he obtained the existing wife’s permission for his second marriage: see the 
Ordinance 1961 ss 2(a), 6(2). 
10
 In Begum v Sarkar, the High Court of Bangladesh held that the Nikhanama is essential to prove a marriage. ‘No 
amount of oral evidence can cure the deficiency and no amount of oral evidence is sufficient to prove marriage when 
the plaintiff fails to prove the [Nikhanama] according to law’: [1998] 50 DLR 181, 183. 
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restrict husbands from polygamous marriages or from dowry demands when they understand that 
their ‘implied strategies’ are not ‘cost-effective’. 
A more severe penalty for the failure to accurately register a marriage should also be 





Despite legislative and administrative initiatives, dowry remains widespread in 
Bangladesh and women’s legal remedies are frustrated by a series of powerful factors that must 
be addressed. The following policy recommendations might be supportive of redressing the 
situation. 
 
1. Significant flaws in the Act, enforcement measures and in the liability provision for 
taking dowry (identified above) must be resolved. The court’s discretionary power 
regarding penalty for dowry (under section 3 of the Act) should be removed. 
2. Given the practical-disadvantageous position of the bride’s parents in a marriage, section 
3 must be amended to penalise only the taker or abettors of dowry not the giver. 
3. Section 3 should incorporate a provision which requires all voluntary presents given in 
the event of marriage to be listed and registered with the court. 
4. The term ‘indirect demand’ under section 4 needs to be specifically clarified so that no 
demand can escape punishment due to the vagueness of the term. 
5. Section 6 should be restored to provide women with economic security in their 
matrimonial homes.  
6. Mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies must be introduced to combat the dowry-
related violence. Police and prosecutors are likely to be more sensitive and active in 
handling dowry cases if the law imposes a mandatory obligation to arrest and prosecute 
the offenders. Such a policy would reduce threats to victims by perpetrators who 
otherwise try to make them withdraw their application. 
7. Compulsory training should be introduced which must focus on progressive, multi-
facetted strategies embodying international best practices and aiming to sensitise all 
officials, especially police, involved in dowry prosecution and to raise their 
consciousness of the law and core values of human life. 
8. The government should issue appropriate directives supported by an authoritative 
enforcement method to investigate, correct, and stop such police treatment that denies 
women’s remedies. 
9. In dowry prosecution, the burden of proof should be shifted onto the accused in some 
respects such as proving that he/she did not commit dowry offence. 
10. A provision for presumption of cruelty and beating to obtain dowry, or the suicide of a 
woman within seven years of her marriage should be incorporated in the Act. Also, 
similar provision of presumption as in India could be legislated in instances where there 
is evidence of cruelty or grievous hurt to women in connection with dowry.  
11. More stringent punishment, ie, five years imprisonment or BDT50,000 (USD500) fine in 
cases of polygamous marriage and double that for the husband’s failure to provide dower 
should be introduced. The increased penalty should work as a deterrent. 
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12. The traditional mentality of the in-laws has to be changed—a mass social awareness 
campaign program by government and activist organisations can change mind-set and 




Law is bound to be meaningless if it is structured and enforced in ways that ignore the 
reality of a particular society. This is similarly true if the proper enforcement machinery does not 
accompany it. International human rights law sets a basic standard for prohibiting domestic 
abuse. The recognition of the issue at the domestic level warrants that due regard must be 
provided to the overt and covert aspects of dowry as well as to the restructuring of the legal 
system so that it becomes more effective in dealing with the reality. Likewise, the proliferation 
of progressive laws in a comparative perspective provides ample evidence of exploiting the 
positive experience to lessen the sufferings of traditionally disadvantaged women in Bangladesh. 
Drawing on this insight, the paper recommends the reconstruction of the legal approach that 
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